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NGOs, Doctors, and the Patrimonial State – Tactics for Political 
Engagement in Nigeria 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) feature prominently in global health 
and development discourses.  Such discourses often assume that NGOs provide a 
supplement to, and critical engagement with, struggling government health care 
systems.  In contrast, interviews and ethnography with patients, health care 
providers, and NGO workers in Kebbi State, Nigeria, suggest a more problematic 
mode of state/NGO interaction. 
 
Focusing on larger NGOs, this research suggests that they are often politically 
impotent, a product of both a difficult political environment and their own 
inflexibility.  In contrast, medical professionals are pursuing many of the same 
political goals with considerable success.  The benefits and compromises of these 
contrasting strategies are explored.  This article also offers an empirical 
contribution to debates on working ‘with the grain’ of patrimonial politics as an 
alternative to the ‘good governance’ agenda. 




Development been described as a story of initial optimism, followed by disappointment 
(Escobar 1994).  Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have followed a similar 
trajectory. Much development studies scholarship has attempted to describe, promote, 
condemn, improve or leave behind this diverse class of organisations (for instance, Igoe 
and Kelsall 2005).  The notion that NGOs are uniquely placed to do certain kinds of 
development work has been tarnished, yet they continue to control significant resources.   
 
Meanwhile, a broad range of scholarship has discussed the various features of Nigeria’s 
political landscape, often emphasising factors that perpetuate underdevelopment and 
poverty.  Nigeria’s ‘intense ethnic polarisation and conflict’ (Mustapha 2005, 4), and its 
‘swelling state, feeding political corruption and instability’ (Diamond 1988, 33) have 
created a situation in which ‘routine relationships between the state and society 
[are]…dominated by discourses on the illegitimacy of instrumentalized distribution and 
disorder’ (Gore and Pratten 2003, 212). 
 
Amid declining confidence in some of the key institutions of development and 
unpromising political contexts such as Nigeria, some actors have called for a more 
flexible approach, particularly regarding the necessity of ‘good government’ for 
development (Hickey 2012).   Scholars such as those working at the ‘Africa Power and 
Politics Centre’ have made important progress in exploring what ‘development 
patrimonialism’ and working ‘with the grain’ might entail (e.g. Kelsall 2008, 2011; 
Crook and Booth 2011; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012).  In short, these scholars have 
argued that certain forms of governance and accountability in sub-Saharan Africa that 
diverge from Western ideals persist.  Given their apparent durability, development 
actors are obliged, so the argument goes, to work within rather than against such norms.  
Much work, however, remains to be done in elaborating what these ideas might mean in 
practice. 
 
This paper is a review of and empirical contribution to these debates.  It presents case 
studies that contrast different approaches to dealing with one manifestation of Nigeria’s 
political arrangements.  In Kebbi state, in North-West Nigeria, the political activities of 
a large international NGO and medical professionals are described, demonstrating their 
broadly similar political agendas.  Both are attempting to cajole the state government 
into reforming health care provision, yet they do so with strikingly different tactics and 
results. 
 
The medical professionals are shown to be skilled political operators, able to use a 
variety of techniques to extract significant changes from the local government – though 
not without some awkward compromises.  In contrast, the NGO struggles to make the 
best of its capacity, as it is tied to a set of inflexible and ineffective tactics in its 
programmes and advocacy. 
 
These case studies suggest that the debate about going ‘with the grain’ needs to be 
mindful of both the deep level of expertise that it is often required to effectively engage 
with patrimonial states, and the substantial practical and moral risks involved in 
building partnerships with deeply undemocratic and inequitable systems of government. 
The State NGOs Are In 
NGOs operating in Kebbi state do so in a specific political context.  The premise of this 
analysis is that the ability and the willingness to adapt to this context is a key 
determinant of how influential NGOs can be.  Here, conceptual debates about how to 
describe the patron-client relations in Africa are discussed, as are the specific concepts 
that are most useful in describing Nigeria’s political system.  In addition, some salient 
aspects of Kebbi’s recent history are presented.  Then, debates about the role NGOs 
play in Africa are reviewed. 
Patrons and clients in Africa 
 
Scholars – especially but not exclusively Africanists – in describing political systems 
that diverge from Western ideals have developed a set of related, overlapping and 
sometimes muddled terms, including: ‘clientism’, ‘patrimonialism’, ‘neo-
patrimonialism’, ‘prebendalism’, ‘Big Man politics’ and ‘godfatherism’ (for useful 
overviews, Pitcher et al. 2009). 
 
Whilst these concepts have appeared in various guises and emphasise different issues, 
they all attempt to describe societies that feature both legal-rational forms of 
government and the informal distribution of patronage by public office holders.  
Virtually any society matches this description to some extent, but especially so, it is 
argued, in many postcolonial African states where formal institutions often lack 
legitimacy (Englebert 2000). 
 
However, many of these concepts have been strongly challenged.  It has been argued 
that neo-patrimonialism has been applied to so many different cases that it becomes a 
‘catch all’ term with “little analytical content” (Mkandawire 2013, 6); that it is part of 
an anti-government neoliberal project; or an Afro-pessimist tradition that revels in the 
misery of the continent (see Erdmann and Engel 2007, and deGrassi 2008, for 
summaries of these debates).  In particular, discussing African corruption and 
clientelism risks describing social relationships in highly normative, ethnocentric terms, 
a problem which more universal, neutral terms like ‘neopatrimonial’ only partly avoid 
(Blundo 2006, 22; Booth 2009, 9-18).  
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the concept is often invoked abstractly, without 
sufficient empirical grounding.  Jean-Francois Bayart, one of the most influential 
Africanist theorists of corruption, has rightly been taken to task for his tendency to 
assert “definitive positions despite the flimsy evidential material at his disposal”, and 
“to parade innuendo and hearsay as facts” (Mustapha 2002, 3). 
Patrimonialism in Nigeria 
Consequently, if these concepts are to be invoked at all, it is essential that they are used 
with precision and with empirical grounding.  Daniel Jordan Smith is surely correct 
when he argues that in Nigeria, "navigating corruption preoccupies people in all kinds 
of everyday endeavours, and talk about corruption dominates popular discourse" (2007, 
xiv).  Yet these observations are the beginning of an enquiry, not the end, and care must 
be taken to properly conceptualise and empirically validate such observations. 
 
For this study, it is essential to analyse patrimonialism not merely as a dysfunctional 
appendage to society, but instead part of “ordinary forms of sociability” (Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan 2006, 8); not merely as a form of occasional criminal deviance, but 
instead a practice “at the core of relations between public services and their users” (ibid, 
4).  Even legal systems, seemingly at odds with practices of informal patrimony, 
become shaped by them; as Nuijten and Anders argue “ corruption and law are not 
opposites but constitutive of one another” (2007, 2). 
 Richard Joseph’s concept of ‘prebendalism’ (1987) also takes this approach, and is a 
useful model for this study.  Joseph’s formulation describes not only the exploitation of 
public positions by their incumbents, but also the extensive legitimating practices in 
which “the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or 
ambition but concurrently the satisfaction of the short-term objectives of a subset of the 
general population” (ibid, 67).    
 
Further, he shows how Nigeria’s complex and politicised ethnic groupings, its elections, 
and the distribution of patrimony are mutually reinforcing parts of the same system 
(ibid, esp. 30-54).  Once the practice of dispensing wealth to secure political support – 
patrimonialism (or the same, but concealed behind a modern institutional façade – neo-
patrimonialism) is conceptualised as part of a broader political system, important 
insights become visible.  In particular, it emphasises that office-holders must at least 
“appear [to be] responsive to the wishes of wider sets of people” (ibid, 54).  This is a 
crucial opening that, as we shall see, some groups exploit more effectively than others. 
 
If a patrimonial system is indeed pervasive and embedded, political actors might well 
determine that accommodation is better than confrontation.  Tim Kelsall’s formulation 
of working “with the grain” (2008; 2011) is a challenge to development actors to move 
beyond ‘good government’ orthodoxies and instead “work with the realities of country 
governance as they find them” (Crook and Booth 2011, 101).  Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi’s on Rwanda’s “development patrimonial state” (2012) and Alemu and 
Scoones’ on rural development in Ethiopia (2013) both express qualified enthusiasm for 
such strategies. 
 However, Kelsall’s approach raises various questions (many of which, to his credit, he 
anticipates), from the exact nature of the ‘grain’ in question, as to what kinds of 
compromises and trade-offs might be involved.  Exploring the latter, Lisa Denney 
argues that recent engagements with chiefs in Sierra Leone is a promising avenue 
towards security sector reform, but one fraught with complications and risk when such 
institutions are “characterised by inequitable and exploitative practices, recognised by 
many as a contributing cause of the civil war, yet simultaneously supported by its 
subjects” (2013, 14).  
 
If accommodating patrimonial systems is to be a significant part of working ‘with the 
grain’, much exploration of the promises and pitfalls to this approach needs to be done.  
This study, then, is an assessment of how two particular sets of actors engage with an 
existing political order.  An analysis of their successes, failures and compromises is a 
way of thinking through the possibilities and limitations of such strategies. 
Violent repression 
Nigeria became infamous for its violent repression during the Abacha administration 
(1993-8), not least for the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995.  While things 
have undoubtedly improved since the return to democracy in 1999, the Federal and 
State governments1 nonetheless retain a tendency to intimidate and attack its citizens.  
Particularly useful for documenting these trends are reports of Human Rights Watch, 
                                                 
1 Nigeria is divided into 36 states, which are in turn sub-divided into Local Government Areas.  
All three levels of government interact with NGOs and are involved in health-care provision, 
but the intermediate level of state government is of most relevance to this study. 
which distil a range of newspaper and primary sources topics such as the indirect use of 
vigilante groups in political struggles (2002), the impunity with which security forces 
maim and injure (2005, 2012), and the relationship between politics, corruption and 
violence more generally (2003, 2007). 
 
Other issues complicating political advocacy include the long-running conflict in the 
Niger Delta, a complex series of clashes involving a diverse range of state and non-state 
groups bound together in an ‘informal economy of violence’ (Ibeanu and Luckham 
2007, 43), and the violent Islamist attacks and equally violent state response (Adesoji 
2011). 
 
In short, parts of the Nigerian state are willing to use or incite violence against 
perceived threats.  It should also be noted that NGOs are by no means excluded from 
these intimidatory techniques: in 2007, two staff members from ActionAid were 
detained by the State Security Service (a domestic intelligence agency) in Kebbi, in 
connection with their role in a campaign against water privatization (see Daily Trust 
2007).  Another example of a police/NGO struggle involves a campaign against child-
witchcraft related abuse (see SSNCEF 2010). 
 
This is not to suggest that corruption and violent repression are essential or timeless 
features of Nigeria.  Indeed, Nigeria has experienced rapid change and repeated 
upheaval in its recent history – decolonisation followed alternating periods of 
democracy and dictatorship, with successful military coups taking place in 1966, 1975, 
1983, 1985 and 1993 (Falola and Heaton 2008, xiii- xviii has a useful chronology), a 
civil war in 1967-70, and numerous conflicts, often along ethnic and religious lines (see 
Sklar 1963 for an early account of these dynamics, or Falola 1998 and Higazi 2008 for 
more recent examples). 
 
Despite these disruptive trends, patrimonialism and violent repression are notable 
constants in recent decades.  Given that the Nigerian state is prone to using patrimony to 
pacify certain constituencies, and violence to repress others, advocates of social and 
political change have to carefully navigate their relationship with the state and employ 
innovative strategies in order to achieve their goals.  
Politics in Kebbi 
These specifically Nigerian forms of politics find a particular local articulation in the 
region of this study.  Kebbi is a new state, created out of the old Sokoto state in 1991. 
With a population of 3.2 million, and a predominantly agricultural economy, Kebbi, and 
indeed the North in general has long been poor – both in absolute terms, and relative to 
the rest of Nigeria.  Health services are severely limited, and diseases of poverty are 
common.  Official statistics show that 53% of children in the North-West sub-region are 
classified as stunted (a symptom of malnutrition), and a mere 6% have received all the 
basic vaccinations (NPC and ICF Macro 2009). 
 
As a consequence of this poverty, a number of development organisations are active in 
Kebbi.  Additionally, the conservative Islamic politics of Northern Nigeria have 
significance for development actors.  Since twelve Northern states declared a version of 
Sharia Law in 1999, there has been considerable concern that the region “could become 
an incubating site for militant Islam and possibly terrorism” (Obi 2006, 99).  Boko 
Haram, the violent, fundamentalist Islamist group, “has managed to attract considerable 
popular support in northern Nigeria despite harsh police and army repression” 
(Loimeier 2012, 138).  For Western governments, this deteriorating situation has been 
made addressing poverty in the region a priority. For instance, the UK government’s 
Department for International Development’s plan argues, “progress in northern Nigeria 
will help regional stability across the Sahel, where the potential for terrorism is a 
concern” (DFID 2009, 3). 
 
Kebbi’s status as a relatively new state also has a bearing on this study.   The process of 
establishing the new state’s government was highly disruptive, requiring the 
establishment of a whole range of new bureaucracies, and the relocation of 70% of the 
previously Sokoto-based staff responsible for administering Kebbi to the new capital, 
Birnin Kebbi (Alapiki 2005, 63).  Despite the considerable challenges in effectively 
governing this new, poor, and sparsely populated region, many interviewees in this 
research emphasized that ‘Birnin Kebbi is a small town’.  That is to say, a closely 
connected elite dominates senior positions, and whilst formal bureaucracies are often 
dysfunctional, those with grievances or requests – at very least the heads of well-known 
families in good-standing – are usually able to secure an audience with the relevant 
official relatively quickly.  The interpersonal quality of governance in Kebbi state and 
its consequences will be explored further below. 
NGOs 
The story of NGOs in development is by now a familiar one: a surge of enthusiasm and 
activity in the 1990s, followed by a backlash of scepticism (Igoe and Kelsall 2005).  
NGOs have been criticised in a myriad of ways.  They have been accused of supporting 
a neo-liberal agenda (Mohan 2002), and of acting a comprador class “dependent on 
external resources and patronage” (Hearn 2007, 1107).  They have also been criticised 
as being  beholden to Western interests, beset by “structural imbalances that reward 
upward accountability [and] encourage limited, problematic forms of participation” 
(Dixon and McGregor 2011, 1372).  Similarly, Reimann argues that NGOs are often too 
reliant on official funding and cooperation, and thus “politically muzzled…shy[ing] 
away from any meaningful ‘empowerment’ activities” (2005, 43).  Commins suggests 
that this muzzling can even result in NGOs acting as “ﬁg-leaves to cover government 
inaction or indifference to human suffering” (in Pearce 2000, 20).  Finally, Dichter 
argues that NGOs often struggle to sustain a radical or critical orientation, and instead 
are liable to “act as if they were corporations engaged in the world of commerce” (1999, 
52). 
 
Both the technical capabilities and political position of NGOs has been subject to 
comprehensive criticism.  Indeed, the legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs has even 
received a degree of popular debate2.  Given the diversity of organisations calling 
themselves NGOs, it should not be surprising that such a daunting charge sheet can be 
assembled.  And as Jim Igoe points out, this swing “between exuberance and despair 
(and sometimes back again)” (2005, xi) has at least as much to do a wildly inflated set 
of expectations than with the activities of NGOs themselves. 
 
As potent as these criticisms are, they have by no means destroyed the NGO project.  
Scholars in the last two decades investigated “the zenith of Africa’s NGO revolution” 
(Igoe and Kelsall 2005, 2) and the subsequent disappointments in real-time.   In 
contrast, the last few years have had a somewhat more mundane tenor: few, it seems, 
give serious credence to the notion of NGOs as dynamic agents of revolutionary 
                                                 
2 For example, ‘NGO hopes to benefit from failure’, Guardian, 17 January 2011, or a recent 
BBC World Service series (first broadcast 27 December 2011) ‘The Truth About NGOs’. 
change.  However, despite their credibility being badly wounded,  NGOs limp on, and 
they remain so well entrenched in the development system they not only persist, in 
many cases, they thrive (Ossewaarde 2008). 
 
Should the development sector, then, be trying to bring to a close the NGO era?  Or 
would it be better to attempt running repairs to a flawed but still useful sector?  The case 
studies presented below suggest there is something to be salvaged from development 
NGOs.  However, in this context at least, they may need to rethink their methods of 
local political advocacy. 
 
Struggling With the State In Kebbi 
Why NGOs struggle to fulfil their political potential is in a large part of consequence of 
their failure to adapt to local contexts.  The two case studies here have been chosen to 
illustrate this.  They emerged from a doctoral research project3 which began by 
mapping out which people and institutions are most active in providing support and care 
for HIV positive people.  It quickly became apparent that aside from the families of the 
affected, the most important actors were government health services and a small group 
of active NGOs. 
 
                                                 
3   This material was gathered during 16 months of doctoral fieldwork between 2009-2011, in 
three spells. The fieldwork was principally ethnographic – supplemented by informal 
interviews – in hospitals, NGOs and various government agencies, as well as in the homes 
and workplaces of HIV positive people. 
 
Subsequent ethnographic research explored these two groups, which obviously differ in 
all sorts of ways – the scope and longevity of their interventions, the ways in which they 
are directed and held to account, the composition of their staff, and so on.  Importantly, 
both the NGO and the doctors acted as advocates for patients, as intermediaries able to 
urge the government to do more.  Both repeatedly cited their mission to speak on behalf 
of otherwise weak and silenced patients, and both had frequent opportunities to discuss 
their concerns with the relevant state officials. 
 
Thus, while the two sets of actors are by no means perfectly symmetrical, they occupy a 
similar position as interlocutors or brokers within the patrimonial state, and both see this 
form of advocacy as central to their work.  The first case study showcases an example 
of professionals who are skilful in such interactions, and the second is an ethnographic 
examination of the nature of, and reasons behind, the self-restricting institutional 
inflexibility of NGOs. 
Case Study – Salary reform and medical professionals 
In the time I spent working in Kebbi state (which included voluntary work in the HIV 
sector prior to this research project), the doctors I worked with tended to affect a 
patrician, paternal, and possessive concern towards their patients.  As I met with 
doctors, arranging house visits (during my voluntary work) or asking about a project 
they were planning, they were often quick to contextualise their work in local politics.   
 
Doctors often offered opinions without prompting on the desperate state of a particular 
clinic due to the neglect of an official, satisfaction with improvements at another, and 
comparisons with facilities in neighbouring states.  Furthermore, almost every doctor 
seemed to be in the process of petitioning the state government for support for one 
project or another.  The causes were various, and covered cases that seemed selfless and 
others that seemed to involve a measure of personal gain: a plea to improving staffing 
levels in a maternal clinic or to procure new equipment (perhaps from a supplier 
acquainted with the doctor).  
 
In conversation, doctors repeatedly emphasised that they were responsible for their 
patients in a broad sense than included political advocacy as well as clinical care.  As 
the following case study shows, this role involves a combination of sincerity, idealism, 
and compromise.  In early 2010, the Kebbi State Government introduced a new system 
for paying the salaries of its civil servants. This proved to be a significant controversy, 
which placed the doctors’ role as advocates and brokers at its heart.  The state 
government is a major employer, particularly within the urban centres. This includes 
teachers, some lecturers, doctors, nurses, as well as various employees of the state’s 
numerous bureaucracies. 
 
The salary change, known as the ‘e-payment’ system, was introduced by the then 
Governor Saidu Usman Dakingari, ostensibly to tackle the widespread problem of 
fraud.  It is widely alleged (for instance, Daily Trust 2010b, Uchegbu 2011, or more 
generally in Nigeria; Omotosho 2011) that senior officials packed government payrolls 
with family members and associates who hold positions but rarely appear at their offices 
or complete significant tasks.  Others simply hired multiple ‘ghost employees’4 – 
fictitious persons whose salaries flow back to the corrupt official in question.  For those 
                                                 
4 The Hausa phrase ‘mai katan jabu’ (fake workers) was often used.  Opinions were split as to 
whether the revised system was a genuine effort to root out corruption, or merely a 
‘changing of the guard’ as new clique took over. 
with the clout to set up and conceal them, such scams are highly lucrative – several 
informants said that such schemes were second only to ‘kickbacks’5 in their 
profitability.  
 
The reform, which involved centralising salaries rather than allowing individual 
departments to disburse funds, did not go smoothly.  An understated government press 
release referred to ‘problems associated with the exercise’, meaning the delay or non-
payment of salaries for thousands of workers.  In May 2010, some had not received 
their salaries for several months, and many thousands more have suffered various delays 
and partial payments, issues that took until early 2011 to fully resolve.  Interviewees 
were unanimous in assigning blame for the problems: powerful officials with a vested 
interest in seeing the new system fail, and the delays and problems associated were the 
fruit of their sabotage. 
 
The intricate details of the wrangling matter less than the general issues that the 
controversy illuminates, especially the manner in which it was resolved.  The first is the 
close relationship between the re-distribution of wealth, and the provision of 
government jobs.  In other contexts, hiring large numbers of workers with little 
expectation that they will perform useful tasks is an anathema to ‘good government’, in 
which ‘wasting tax-payers’ money’ is a grievous sin.   Yet the concept of ‘tax-payers’ 
                                                 
5 Fees paid to officials to award contracts to a particular vendor. The scale of such schemes 
varies enormously.  The former governor of Kebbi state was accused of systematic looting 
amounting to N10.2 billion (approximately US$68m, Vanguard, 2009), whereas one doctor 
mentioned a colleague’s rumoured scheme to supply hospital consumables, which was worth 
only a few dollars a month. 
money’ relies on the existence of a fiscal social contract in which taxes are paid with the 
expectation provision of services in return.  Such contracts tend to be weaker in 
countries like Nigeria where taxation is low and much revenue flows from natural 
resource wealth (Moore and Schneider 2004, especially 6-7).   
 
The problems of poverty and unemployment, especially youth unemployment – are so 
extreme that hiring workers is seen as an essential duty of the state.  Unemployment is 
also seen as a threat to social order – as one opinion piece in a national newspaper 
lamented, Governor Dakingari “does not know what to do with huge army of 
unemployed youth in Kebbi and so they are always available for use in the rising cases 
of thuggery in the state” (Daily Trust 2010a).  There is also a strong ethnic dimension to 
this process: allocating state resources to Hausa individuals and families was seen as an 
important responsibility – but this topic is outside the scope of this paper.   
 
Thus, the state government framed the ‘e-payment’ reform not simply as cutting out 
corrupt middle men, but also making sure that disbursement was ‘correct’: that is, 
amongst a broad spread of the right people, rather than a narrow elite.  The state 
commissioner of finance said in a newspaper interview: “I don’t think there should be 
apprehension over the e-payment system because government [sic] intends to introduce 
it in order to fish out all ghost workers in the government’s pay roll and provide security 
to salaries of civil servants” (This Day 2009).  
 
As things started to go wrong and payments were blocked, medical professionals taking 
industrial action in protest were able to reuse this framing for their own purposes.  In 
both private and semi-public meetings, as well as in press statements, they connected 
their payment issues with concerns over a lack of investment in health care, and 
especially the ability to recruit and retain health care staff.  The doctor who chaired the 
local branch of the Nigerian Medical Association was a key negotiator, and he 
emphasised to me that “we are all proud people of this state, but so many will be 
leaving because of the problems [with salaries]”.6  He added that, “Kebbi state has 537 
nurses, but up to 80% have [job] interviews at other places [outside the state]”. 
 
Despite concerns over the ethics of medical personnel abandoning their posts (Okoye, 
2007), such strikes have been common for some time in Nigeria. Alubo’s examination 
of a series of medical strikes in in the 1970s and 80s demonstrates that they were 
remarkably successful in securing concessions, in part because of “a sense of doctors as 
‘special’” (1986, 474).   
 
In this case, the ability of medical staff – and especially doctors – to exercise their 
privileged position appears to be intact.  The medical strike in Kebbi – after numerous 
delays and last-ditch negotiations – began on 27th December 2010 (Sun 2010).  It only 
lasted a few days, resulting in at least a partial triumph for the strikers.  The details of 
how this deal was resolved are intriguing.  In addition to their statements to news media, 
the doctors were able to leverage their political connections, not least because many 
were themselves from prominent families.  
 
                                                 
6 Interview with Dr. Yusuf Sununu, December 14th 2010. 
I knew one doctor7 particularly well, and would often watch satellite TV at his home in 
the evenings, as we lived in the same housing estate.  He always received a steady 
stream of guests in the evening: colleagues, family friends, and patients seeking out-of-
hours advice.  For these guests, he always kept a stethoscope and a pad of prescription 
forms on the table, and a fridge stocked with soft drinks. During the strike, his living 
room became something of a nerve centre for negotiations.  Although the doctor was 
not an official negotiator, his seniority and political connections made him an important 
broker. 
 
The tone of these discussions – at least the ones in which I was present - was strikingly 
cordial.  Emissaries from the state government would arrive, and linger over customary 
greetings in a particularly deliberate fashion – lamenting the recent passing of a mutual 
acquaintance, or asking in turn about each other’s relatives.  The content of the 
discussion too – despite ostensibly being about a deadlocked labour dispute – 
emphasised consensus.   
 
A shared narrative of health care in the state was often retold – a story I heard again and 
again in different forms from almost everyone I spoke to.  Health care services when 
Kebbi state was created in 1991 were extremely basic, and had remained parlous for 
much of the following decade.  Significant improvements had been made since then 
however, and Kebbi citizens took pride in the fact that fewer patients felt the need to 
travel out-of-state to receive good care. 
                                                 
7 As discussed, political disputes in Nigeria can be highly contentious and unpredictable, so the 
doctors quoted are not identified, with the exception of Dr. Sununu, the union representative, 
who asked to be identified. 
 A key bargaining chip for the striking doctors was their ability to either endorse or 
tarnish this narrative of accomplishment.  When I asked one doctor about a negotiation 
he had attended late the previous evening, he said he had told one of the governor’s 
senior aides that they “always tell people how far we [the people of Kebbi] have come, 
and how the governor has always been our friend”.  Within the compliment was an 
implied threat that the doctors might withdraw their valuable support should the dispute 
not be satisfactorily resolved. 
 
“We really reach down to the grassroots” said the same doctor.  “Everyday at the 
hospital I see people from every nook and cranny of the state.  They are all my people”.  
Like the Malawian civil servants Anders describes, much of the potency of the doctors 
lies in their ability to manage “widely branching networks; bridging huge differences in 
social position and location” (2002, 2). 
 
An example of doctors and the state governments were frequently at loggerheads over 
particular issues, but they shared a strong pride that Kebbi was making great strides 
forward.  Even those doctors who were disappointed with Governor Dakingari and his 
predecessor Muhammad Adamu Aliero nonetheless tempered their criticism – both in 
public and private – by acknowledging the progress that had been made. 
 
In this context, a shared loyalty to Kebbi was a powerful motivator.  At the end of a 
long conversation in my doctor friend’s living room, mostly in Hausa, a state Ministry 
of Health official, said to me in English: ‘We are not going to any other place, we 
cannot run away to Lagos or Kano, so we have to make a solution’.  In such meetings, 
doctors made clear how seriously they viewed the salary problems and other issues, but 
also emphasised their loyalty to the governor and the state.  For example, in one 
meeting, a doctor made a lengthy speech lamenting the fact that a trial scheme to train 
traditional birth attendants had petered out, instead of being expanded. The criticism 
was passionate, but never personalised to a particular official, or indeed the governor.  
This combination of pressure from an embarrassing disruption in health care services 
from the strike (especially acute as gubernatorial elections took place four months later, 
in April 2011) and discreet, non-confrontational lobbying proved highly effective. 
 
A salary deduction that made state employees’ net salaries significantly lower than that 
of comparable Federal Employees – a source of irritation repeatedly mentioned by all 
strikers – was suspended. ‘We have been assured that the demand for reduction on 
taxation of our members and implementation of policies that would reduce the exodus 
of medical workers and better conditions of service would be met”, said Dr. Sununu in a 
public statement (Tide 2011).  One doctor put it more bluntly, echoing a popular 
sentiment among doctors when saying: ‘We got 90% of what we wanted’8. 
 
The lessons are clear. Medical professionals, and especially doctors, demonstrated that 
by formatting claims in a particular way, and by using social networks and political 
expertise sensitively, they were able to extract significant concessions.   It is important 
neither to exaggerate nor to underplay these accomplishments. Their actions involved 
both challenging the patrimonial system, but also working within it.  Doctors 
emphasised how substantive improvements were necessary, and it was not sufficient to 
                                                 
8 Interview, January 11th, 2011. 
buy-off constituencies with promises to build a new clinic or hospital. Nonetheless, in 
other ways, they accepted and reaffirmed the logic that the governor’s role was to be a 
provider for his people – and they talked about his ‘generosity’ and ‘kindness’. 
 
This example suggests that when the state government is in one sense resilient and able 
to partially deflect popular disaffection by making commitments that are partly 
substantive and partly symbolic.  Yet it is a form of resilience which savvy groups are 
able to exploit.   
 
There is a moral ambivalence to the doctors’ role.  On the one hand, doctors cannot 
transform Kebbi’s political system, and in many cases work effectively ‘with the grain’ 
to encourage incremental improvements.  On the other hand, this mode of engagement 
often brings the doctors into the unenviable position as apologists and defenders of a 
government that is far from perfect.  This is a particularly awkward situation with an 
issue such as salaries, which inevitably combines altruistic reform with elements of self-
interest.   The flexible role of the doctors, however, takes on a more respectable sheen 
compared to the less effective strategy of a large NGO. 
Case Study – Health For All 
A broad range of NGOs exist in Kebbi state.  Even within the thematic area of 
HIV/AIDS – the focus of my doctoral research – some thirty-eight local organisations 
are listed as active according to one directory (unpublished document, Civil Society for 
HIV/AIDS in Nigeria, 16 August 2010).  In addition, a number of national and 
international NGOs work in Kebbi – including well-known organisations such as 
ActionAid and Médecins Sans Frontières.  Small NGOs rooted in a particular place 
(often called ‘community-based organisations’) are an intriguing phenomenon but 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus here is on larger NGOs9: typically 
either international bodies, or at least part of international networks of funding and 
expertise.   
 
These organisations are uniquely placed to contribute to political, economic and social 
reform in Kebbi yet are often, by the admission of their own staff, frustrated and 
marginalised.  I studied several such organisations, but the most relevant for this study 
is an organisation referred to here as Health for All10 (HFA).  HFA works in several 
African countries, has an office in Nigeria’s capital Abuja, and runs programmes in 
several Nigerian states.  Over four months in HFA’s Kebbi programme office I sat in on 
meetings, travelled to visit distant projects and participated in various workshops.  In 
many ways, the organisation met the stereotype of a big international NGO – large 
white Landcruisers parked in the office’s walled-off compound, regular meetings 
conducted with participatory techniques, and the omni-present development jargon of 
‘stake-holders’ and ‘capacity building’. 
 
HFA had a striking concentration of well-qualified and capable staff.  Almost all of 
HFA’s employees – even lowly administrative staff and drivers – were graduates, often 
from Nigeria’s most prestigious institutions.  Many of the senior staff had studied 
                                                 
9 Again, this decision was made following a process of identifying the organisations most 
prominent in the lives of the HIV+ people that I researched. 
10 The decision to conceal this organisation behind a pseudonym is a difficult one, as identifying 
it would add useful contextual information.  However, given that frank private views are 
reported it is necessary, as with the doctors, to protect research participants from potential 
political consequences. 
abroad or worked abroad, or were studying expensive postgraduate distance learning 
courses at British or American universities.  Several were qualified and experienced 
doctors. 
 
Almost all of HFA’s staff also shared a passionate and often highly informed interest in 
politics.  Over lunch, on a long drive to a rural clinic, or after work – conversation 
invariably turned to political issues, discussing both the fates of various local politicians 
or parties, and making sense of broader issues in Nigerian society.  Most were idealistic, 
and lamented the current state of Nigeria – often saving me a newspaper cutting, or 
sharing a link to a cartoon on Facebook to make a point. 
 
In short, HFA was staffed by an educational and intellectual elite, voracious in their 
appetite for political news in all forms, and sophisticated in their understanding of 
issues.  Additionally, the projects that they had been tasked with delivering – a variety 
of activities related to HIV treatment support – emphasised the need for engagement 
and advocacy with the state government.  The proficiency of this staff, in combination 
with their access to international capital – that is to say the funding for their project – 
would seem to make them well placed to engage with the Kebbi state government. HFA 
staff also had extensive contact with state government officials at a variety of 
levels.  They attended the regular meetings of the State Action Committee on AIDS 
(SACA), a statutory body responsible for coordinating HIV treatment and 
prevention. Additionally, HFA ran several projects that took place within state facilities, 
such as a drop-in counseling service for HIV positive people being run at several 
regional hospitals, which involved frequent meetings with officials.  
 
Nonetheless, a highly cautious mode of political engagement predominated.  In private, 
HFA staff complained about the state government.  Out for drinks after work, the staff 
would trade stories of the poor condition of a hospital, an incompetent official, or an ill-
conceived project.  A particularly common complaint was the government’s perceived 
preference for big capital projects like hospital construction – which was seen as both a 
political strategy to show demonstrable progress, and an opportunity for corruption 
during the construction process.  These eye-catching projects came at the expense – so 
they argued – of more mundane activities like staff recruitment and training.  They also 
expressed concern that state hospitals were struggling to retain qualified staff, largely 
due to low wages.  In short, HFA staff broadly shared a reform agenda with the medical 
professionals.  They also emphasised their role as advocates on behalf of patients.  One 
HFA officer, a medical doctor, explained why he had chosen to work for an NGO rather 
than practice medicine: “When I first qualified, the HIV situation was very bad.  
Patients were afraid to come out, and the government was doing nothing about it.  That 
is why we doctors have to be politicians.” 
 
Yet during the meetings they had with senior officials, this zeal for advocacy was 
conspicuously absent.  Pleasantries and mundane procedural issues predominated, and it 
was clear that certain topics, especially corruption and spending priorities were off-
limits.   When asked about this tension between idealism and political neutrality, HFA 
gave somewhat contradictory responses:  "The political situation here is quite difficult, 
we need to be quite careful" said one member of staff.  Yet in the same conversation, 
the blame was directed towards HFA itself: "Even the director [of the HFA office in 
Kebbi] is not really the director, our programme is all planned for us before we 
arrive."11  Another said "at the SACA meetings, we are always being asked for 
something, and you know, these are very good ideas - some small workshops or 
something, but our hands are tied, we cannot freelance"12. In short, they attributed their 
reticence to two factors: one was a pragmatic understanding that state government was 
ultimately a gatekeeper to their work, and they relied on its consent to continue.  To be 
told to leave would be a professional disaster for the senior staff.    
 
The second constraint – a subtle but powerful factor – was a pervasive form of upward 
accountability.  A particular phrase captures this issue: ‘it needs to be sent to Abuja’.  
The ‘it’ being a report, form, spreadsheet or other document, and ‘Abuja’ meaning 
HFA’s head office.  Among the staff, the phrase was repeated almost mantra-like, to the 
point where its common usage became an in-joke. 
 
For instance, HFA began a round of workshops training volunteers to give advice on 
drug adherence counselling – sessions to encourage patients to take their anti-retroviral 
drugs correctly, long recognised as a complex and important issue in HIV treatment 
(e.g. Rao et al. 2007).  It quickly became clear to both the HFA staff and myself, as I sat 
in on these sessions, that the training was at too basic a level, and largely unnecessary as 
most of the participants had clearly already been well schooled on these issues at 
previous events.  This may well be in part because these particular treatment-competent 
groups tended to contain few of the younger patients that are seen as especially 
challenging for drug adherence (Falang et al. 2012). 
  
                                                 
11 Interview, February 15th, 2011. 
12 Interview, February 13th, 2011.  
Many participants suggested that instead of doing these superfluous workshops, could 
HFA not support the volunteer counsellors in a more practical way – for instance, by 
providing a small, regular transport allowance to allow those in rural clinics to fetch 
drugs from the city?  Or by offering more specific treatment support – dietary tips, or 
advice on managing particular drug side-effects perhaps?  HFA could not.  The 
worksheets and detailed programme specifications had locked the HFA staff into 
inappropriate activities, preventing even minor deviations from the schedule. 
Another example illustrates the costs of HFA’s rigidity in a different setting.  A group 
of doctors at one of Birnin Kebbi’s main hospitals were planning a one-day workshop 
also on anti-retroviral drug adherence, this time as training for counsellors.  
Serendipitously, two HFA staff members had run a similar course elsewhere in Nigeria.  
The group of doctors approached HFA with a plan to expand the course to include a 
more detailed curriculum, more participants, and with sessions in smaller groups to take 
advantage of having more training staff. 
 
The doctors – who had a strict budget of their own – suggested that HFA contribute to 
the cost of the workshop by paying the per diems for half of the thirty proposed 
participants, with the hospital budget covering the other half as well as the venue and 
other costs.   These per diems would have been a very modest sum (perhaps US$50-70 
in total) but again HFA regretfully declined the offer as the local staff had no discretion 
to authorise the spending. 
 
Again, an opportunity to complete productive work that was in line with HFA’s stated 
agenda was spurned.  More consequentially in the long term, a chance was missed for 
hospital doctors and HFA staff to strengthen relationships, and creating future 
opportunities to work together.  I asked one doctor who told me one version of this story 
if HFA was particularly bad.  No, he replied, the behaviour was typical – other NGOs 
are even worse because ‘at least [HFA] are taking to us, and I can always reach them 
[on the phone], the others will not pick my calls – but still [HFA] are not joining us’. 
 
In a setting where corruption is such a serious problem, it is perhaps a little churlish to 
object to this forensic mode of accounting.  But as Harsh et al. (2010) have shown 
elsewhere, this mode of accountability has consequences beyond being merely a 
cumbersome administrative burden.  It profoundly limits what can take place, and at 
worst can create organisations whose sole “mission [is] to provide accounts — financial 
records and success stories” (274).  HFA staff openly acknowledged and lamented their 
self-imposed marginality.  One said: “Of course, I would like to say more things [to the 
state government], and do something of the things they are asking for, but that is not 
what we do”.  Many staff members, it seemed, were willing and able to work ‘with the 
grain’ if allowed off the leash. 
  
Individually, these examples may seem trivial, and reflect working practices flawed in a 
rather obvious manner – they were certainly obvious enough to greatly frustrate all 
parties.  Taken collectively, however, the pattern across the organisation, aggregated to 
form a reliably wasteful way of operating.  “These NGOs are always going to do their 
own small-small things”, said one doctor, expressing a common acceptance that NGOs 
were almost wilfully marginalising themselves.  Tellingly, when I discussed my 
impressions with doctors, workers at other NGOs and others besides, no one ever 
seemed surprised.  Instead, people nodded with wry smiles of familiarity and 
frustration. 
 Conclusion 
Even though the professionals discussed in this paper pursue similar goals, move in 
similar circles, and indeed often know each, they act through strikingly different 
strategies. The doctors are nimble enough to exploit opportunities (such as upcoming 
elections) and sufficiently deft to blend occasional confrontation with supportive 
engagement.  They are skilled at moving between roles and registers – one day the 
dutiful supporter of the government, the next a public-minded physician ready to raise 
the alarm for his imperilled patients, the day after that, dutiful once more.  They read the 
political situation skilfully, and are able to “capitalise on clientelism and rule-
flexibility” (Kelsall 2011, 255).  
 
Yet flexibility in tactics implies a concomitant flexibility in ethics.  Their tactics can be 
and are used for the benefit of themselves, and for the broader public good – sometimes 
at the same time.  This places doctors in an ambivalent position regarding the 
patrimonial state – the line between incrementally improving things and endorsing the 
status quo is fine one.  They cannot be said to be meaningfully subverting or 
undermining it.  It is plausible that the immediate gains they are attracting make more 
radical future improvements more difficult.  But in light of the durability of 
patrimonialism as a political system in this context, it appears that going ‘with the grain’ 
is indeed the only effective strategy for encouraging reform. 
 
The NGO, and others like it in the area, orientates itself towards the state very 
differently.  The local expertise of the NGO staff is no match for an internationally 
driven mode of working that precludes the strategies used by doctors.  Research 
elsewhere suggests that this situation is by no means unique, with supposedly 
progressive organisations dominated by “management tools concerned with enforcing 
and regulating” (Powell and Seddon 1997, 7), or worse “apolitical institutions geared 
toward the process of donor funding cycles” (Igoe 2003, 863; see also Harsh et al. 
2010). 
 
Could such an NGO find developmental opportunities even in a political system that is 
a major cause of underdevelopment?  Perhaps so, if they were willing to experiment 
with more flexible forms of accountability, ones which blend necessary rigour with 
discretion devolved to local officers (see Routley 2012 for a compelling example).   
Being able to improvise and adapt, and engage in petty quid-pro-quos could help build 
the “formal and informal channels of access to key political decision-makers” (Bratton 
1990, 116) that are so crucial to effective advocacy.  
 
Further exploration of what it means to work ‘with the grain’ will likely emphasis the 
context-specificity of the issue.  The sheer variety in the nature and permanence of 
patrimonial states will lead to different conclusions to those presented here.  In other 
states where institutions are evolving in different ways, a ‘good governance’ agenda and 
straitlaced NGO strategies may be far more appropriate.  Elsewhere, in places more like 
Northern Nigeria, devising a mode of working that balances the understandable need of 
donors for clarity and accountability with complex, unpredictable and ethically murky 
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